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INTRODUCTION
In the foreword to “‘Law As . . .’ Glossolalia,” Chris Tomlins frames the
central topic of the symposium in terms of jurisprudence and the practice of history
writing. History writing, he argues, enables scholars to rearticulate different aspects
of the ideas, practices, and institutions of law. Considering glossolalia—speaking in
tongues and the expression of divine spirit—suggests Tomlins, might allow us to
say something about contemporary forms of jurisprudence and history writing or,
at least about those genres that remain in touch with the common law tradition.1
This Afterword follows up the projects presented in the “Law As . . .”
symposium as if they articulate a series of jurisprudences that offer a training in the
conduct of office or persona of the (minor) jurisprudent. A jurisprudent, here, can
be characterised as someone who develops a persona or takes up an office, which
cares for the conduct of lawful relations or ways of belonging to law. The training
in conduct addressed here is linked—via glossolalia and “speaking in tongues”—to
the “government of the tongue” and forms of eloquence. Drawing on Chris
Tomlins’s foreword to this symposium, this Afterword wonders too about the
* Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne. The comments on office and conduct presented
here have been developed in collaboration over many years with Shaunnagh Dorsett, Law School,
University of Technology Sydney; and Ann Genovese, Melbourne Law School, University of
Melbourne.
1. See Christopher Tomlins, Foreword. “Law As . . .” III—Glossolalia: Toward a Minor (Historical)
Jurisprudence, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 239 (2015).
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training in conduct offered when forms of history writing become forms of minor
jurisprudence and a guide to a conduct of lawful life (or a life lived with law). The
“government of the tongue” here becomes not an argument about state-managed
free speech or censorship but the art of speaking well and of living with law and
justice.
I. OFFICE AND CONDUCT
Restoring or assigning an office to the jurisprudent today is, perhaps, a little
optimistic. The language and the institutional life of office have for a long time
provided a point of engagement of public life, but they are rarely treated as capable
of generating obligations or distinct styles of conduct or action.2 Some offices, like
those of state (judge, legislator, governor, soldier), church (bishop, priest), and other
public and private corporations, are instituted in formal ways, still often bound by
oath to a higher authority. These offices mark the duties, responsibilities, rights, and
privileges that are taken up in public life. There are other offices, like those of
doctor, engineer, philosopher, poet, artist, or critic, that used to be treated as social
or intellectual offices. Today, they might be viewed in terms of vocation, profession,
or career. In these offices, if they are still such, it is more likely that evaluative work
be assigned to general accounts of normative theory and social management. Office,
I think, remains both a central concern of public life and a distinct mode of
organising participation in public life.
Within the university, we live and use the language of office but mostly in the
context of administrative office and material place. The scholar, historian, jurist,
and jurisprudent might well benefit from being returned to an office that has
purpose (justice and the conduct of a lawful life), a mode and manner of
performance, and evaluation of its virtues and vices. The duties, responsibilities, and
privileges of the scholar are varied and carried in the languages of religious calling,
state education, and commercial activity. The same can be said for the jurisprudent
as an officeholder or person who cares for the conduct of lawful relations.3 How
the obligations of office are understood depends in large part on the authority under
which it is created. The civil authority of the state has shaped office in relation to
forms of nontranscendent authority, desacralised political association, a plurality of
forms of duty, and modes of engaging and creating public life. The authority of the
Christian church has shaped office around liturgy and the ceremonial imitation of
the life of Christ.4 The theologies and jurisprudences that inform such offices and
forms of association have been engaged in the formation and transmission of the

2. ANDREW SABL, RULING PASSIONS: POLITICAL OFFICES AND DEMOCRATIC ETHICS
(2002).
3. PETER GOODRICH, LAW IN THE COURTS OF LOVE: LITERATURE AND OTHER MINOR
JURISPRUDENCES (1996); R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, JUDGES, LEGISLATORS AND PROFESSORS:
CHAPTERS IN EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY (1987).
4. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, OPUS DEI: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF DUTY (Adam Kotsko trans.,
Stanford Univ. Press 2013) (2012).
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Catholic Church and the creation and realignment of political and moral authority
with the West.5 Minor jurisprudents take up office, if at all, in other places or other
ways. Like the work of feminist jurisprudents directed towards creating new
personae for public and private life, the minor jurisprudent may also be engaged in
crafting new juridical personae capable of acting within and without office.6
One link that becomes clearer in joining the conduct of office to
jurisprudential writing is that jurisprudence is joined more directly to Greek, Roman,
and Christian traditions of philosophy that respond to the question, “How should
I conduct a life?” As the historian and philosopher Pierre Hadot has argued, such
responses have been ordered around an induction into the “philosophical life” and
conducted, in large part, through the practice of spiritual exercises.7 Such exercises
were directed to creating and transforming not just the self and a vision of the world
but ways of living and acting in the world.8 At the centre of Hadot’s account of the
classical traditions of philosophy is the teaching offered by the philosopher to the
pupil.9 Philosophy, as Montaigne relates, is not simply a preparation for death, it is
a “continual exercise of the soul,” or an exercise of judgement.10 The importance
of philosophy in this account is practical insofar as it assists the living of a
philosophical life. Such assistance might be thought of in terms of an ensemble of
arts, techniques, and cultivation of forms of intellectual and juridical life. This
includes the art of writing as well as reflection.11

5. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION (1983).
6. EDWARD MUSSAWIR, JURISDICTION IN DELEUZE: THE EXPRESSION AND
REPRESENTATION OF LAW (2011); Ann Genovese, Inheriting and Inhabiting the Pleasures and Duties of Our
Own Existence: The Second Sex and Feminist Jurisprudence, 38 AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 41 (2013).
7. See PIERRE HADOT, PHILOSOPHY AS A WAY OF LIFE: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES FROM
SOCRATES TO FOUCAULT 264–74 (Arnold I. Davidson ed., Michael Chase trans., 1995) [hereinafter
HADOT, PHILOSOPHY AS A WAY OF LIFE]; PIERRE HADOT, WHAT IS ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY? 253–
70 (Michael Chase trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2002) (1995) [hereinafter HADOT, WHAT IS ANCIENT
PHILOSOPHY?]. Hadot characterises these spiritual exercises in terms of a “way of life,” Foucault’s reformulation through a range of texts is “care of the self.” Here, the term “conduct of life” is used to tie
philosophical exercises in with the exercises of persona required to occupy office or public life. With due
recognition of the difficulties of naming any such tradition, the continuing engagement of “spiritual
exercises” and the formulation of might be labelled, for now, as a “conduct of life tradition.” For a
fuller discussion, see Genovese, supra note 6, and Ann Genovese & Shaun McVeigh, Nineteen Eight
Three: A Jurisographic Report on Tasmania v Commonwealth, GRIFFITH LAW REV. (forthcoming 2015),
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10383441.2015.1022891.
8. For an account that gives more emphasis to the commitment to reason, see JOHN M.
COOPER, PURSUITS OF WISDOM: SIX WAYS OF LIFE IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY FROM SOCRATES TO
PLOTINUS 18–20 (2012). See also JUDITH BUTLER, GIVING AN ACCOUNT OF ONESELF (2005).
9. See HADOT, PHILOSOPHY AS A WAY OF LIFE, supra note 7, at 56–65.
10. Pierre Force, Montaigne and the Coherence of Eclecticism, 70 J. HIST. IDEAS, 523, 529 (2009)
(citing MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, Of Pedantry, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF MONTAIGNE: ESSAYS,
TRAVEL JOURNAL, LETTERS 125 (Donald Frame ed. & trans., 1958)).
11. HADOT, WHAT IS ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY?, supra note 7, at 22–34 (discussing forms of life).
Foucault characterises the formation of the self both in terms of “care of the self” and the writing of
the self. Michel Foucault, Writing the Self (1983), reprinted in FOUCAULT AND HIS INTERLOCUTORS 234,
238 (Arnold I. Davidson ed., Ann Hobart trans., 1997).
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In Roman and then Renaissance and early modern thought in Europe, such
exercises, practices, and arts were turned to the training in the conduct and practice
of office. In addition to discharging the duties of office, the holder of an office
offers training, to self and others, in how to form an official life. Considered as a
training in conduct, a central question of the contemporary office of jurisprudent
can be cast as “how can I (or others) conduct a lawful life?” The response, from
within jurisprudence traditions, has not always been expressed in terms either of
“spiritual” or “worldly” exercises, but a significant part of the tradition has done
so.12
One important site for the development of the persona of the jurisprudent lies
with the cultivation of “eloquence.” Most visibly marked through Renaissance legal
humanist scholarship, the Ciceronian elevation of eloquence and persuasion in the
studia humanitatis has provided an important model of the scholar-jurisprudent’s
engagement with forms of office and public life. If dignity (and later, decorum) were
related to the obligations of office, then eloquence in its various forms directs
attention to the persona.13 Humanist eloquence (elocutio) and its rhetorically inflected
ethics provided the forms of propriety, ritual, and ceremony that carried the conduct
of office.14 Eloquence might have been treated as a matter of persuasion, but it was
also the means by which the good life was instituted and transmitted. For humanist
scholars such as Alciatus, elocutio set the humanist scholar apart from dignity and
office. It also opened the site and means of training that give shape to conduct and
set office and its limits in place.15 It also gave the jurisprudent and justice their
character. Within the legal humanist tradition, it was eloquence that determined
conduct and set the limits of office.
The jurisprudence of legal humanists and the elevation of eloquence beyond
office have hardly been passed down uncontested. The exegetical and interpretative
practices of the Roman law glossators and exegetes established a discipline or
training in conduct that has formed the basis of modern civil law legal science and
the office of the modern jurist.16 The early modern civil jurisprudents, for example,
cast the plural offices of public life under a single civil authority.17 Their work drew
12. DONALD R. KELLEY, RENAISSANCE HUMANISM (1991); see also Shaunnagh Dorsett &
Shaun McVeigh, The Persona of the Jurist in Salmond’s Jurisprudence: On the Exposition of ‘What Law Is . . . ,’
38 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 771 (2007).
13. This paragraph draws on the work of Piyel Haldar in Piyel Haldar, The Tongue and the Eye:
Eloquence and the Language of Office in Some Renaissance Emblems, in GENEALOGIES OF LEGAL VISION 152
(Peter Goodrich & Valérie Hayaert eds., forthcoming July 2015). See also Jeffrey Minson, In the Office of
Humanity, 14 CROMOHS 1 (2009) (reviewing STÉPHANE TOUSSAINT, HUMANISMES
ANTIHUMANISMES, I, HUMANITAS ET RENTABILITÉ DE FICINE À HEIDEGGER (2008) (Fr.)), available
at http://www.cromohs.unifi.it/14_2009/minson_toussaint.html.
14. Peter Goodrich, Rhetoric as Jurisprudence: An Introduction to the Politics of Legal Language 4
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 88 (1984).
15. Haldar, supra note 13; see also Robert W. Cape Jr. Cicero and the Development of Prudential Practice
at Rome, in PRUDENCE: CLASSICAL VIRTUES, POSTMODERN PRACTICE 35 (Robert Hariman ed., 2003).
16. BERMAN, supra note 5.
17. IAN HUNTER, RIVAL ENLIGHTENMENTS: CIVIL AND METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY IN
EARLY MODERN GERMANY (2001).
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on a variety of styles of juristic thinking as well as police science and a reformed
protestant natural law in order to establish a training in the service of the state. In
light of such strong accounts of office and jurisprudence, revivals of humanist legal
scholarship have often struggled to establish forms of authority sufficient to address
their chosen forms of lawful life.18 However, the open-ended invitation of the “Law
As . . .” symposia to pursue ways of bringing life to law (if not always law to life) is
one that can be recognised in many of the formulae of a historically inflected legal
humanism.
II. PHILOSOPHY AS TRAINING IN LIFE,
JURISPRUDENCE AS A TRAINING IN OFFICE
One question, then, that might be asked is “what account of training in
conduct of jurisprudents (as university scholars) involved a training in conduct
moving from ‘Law and . . .’ to ‘Law as . . .’”? What I want to do here is note first
that a large number of contributors to the “Law As . . .” symposia have addressed
the issues of training in conduct, although not necessarily as the central topic of
their research. The differences of genre, style of argument, and subject matter make
it difficult to make any typological generalisation about training in conduct offered
in ways of living with law. I want first to recast Chris Tomlins’s introductory
comments on minor jurisprudence as a training and then address some specific
practices presented in “‘Law As . . .’ Glossolalia.”
In his brief account of minor jurisprudences, Tomlins draws out two modes
of engagement with the minor jurisprudence.19 One, drawing on the work of Panu
Minkkinen, emphasises a philosophy of law that takes as its central concern the
relation between Being and right (correctness); these concerns are linked to the end
of philosophy and justice. The other, represented in the work of Peter Goodrich, is
characterised in terms of the social criticism of the institutions of law and, it might
be added, the engagement of law as the social bond.20
Minkkinen’s philosopher (inducted through the study of the Greek and
German philosophical canon) shapes questions of philosophy around man’s
relation to Being or to the world, subject to a unifying philosophical reflection. The
task of the philosopher is one of attunement to the experience of the authenticity
and inauthenticity of being and the transformative event that breaks through the
conditions of experience (hence, the interest in interpreting Kafka’s writing as
somehow beyond all genres of literature and law). In his central formulations,
Minkkinen articulates Being as desire that “reaches out” toward a something (or a
nothing) that is non-appropriable.21 The question of law (or jurisprudence) arises in
18. JEFFREY MINSON, QUESTIONS OF CONDUCT: SEXUAL HARASSMENT, CITIZENSHIP,
GOVERNMENT (1993).
19. Tomlins, supra note 1, at 241, 246.
20. PETER GOODRICH, OEDIPUS LEX: PSYCHOANALYSIS, HISTORY, LAW (1995).
21. PANU MINKKINEN, THINKING WITHOUT DESIRE: A FIRST PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 3
(1999).
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the response to the non-appropriable, in the fall from contemplation into practical
reasoning: correctness. If the “‘true’ thing” cannot be attained, as Minkkinen writes:
“it might as well be ‘correct’” or, in sociopolitical terms, right.22 The training in
remaining sensitive to the “thrownness of man” and the cultivation of a disposition
to treat justice aporetically, is hermeneutic and recognisably part of a tradition of
“spiritual exercise” (one writes to learn the correct relationship to justice or to
correct others). One corollary of this way of engaging the way of life of the
philosopher might be that to be a good jurist or lawyer, it is first necessary to be a
good philosopher. The search for justice can be a spiritual exercise.23
Tomlins and Minkkinen worry that Peter Goodrich’s approach to law is
insufficiently, incorrectly, metaphysical.24 While Goodrich and Minkinnen share a
number of sources of instruction (Lacan and Nietzsche), Goodrich, however, does
not model the persona of the jurist on the philosopher but on the seventeenth
century humanist scholar. Goodrich’s training in conduct proceeds not by reading
the philosophical tradition but through a more diffuse account of humanist
erudition and eloquence.25 While Goodrich shares with Minkkinen a sense that the
induction into a lawful life is to be framed in terms of conducting yourself in relation
to Being and a relationship to justice, what is more interesting to Goodrich is to
pose that training in terms of a common law tradition of rhetoric, casuistry,
emblematics, and philology rather than Roman and German legal science. Whether
a rhetorician-jurisprudent can be inducted into a philosophical life, or whether he
or she would want to be inducted into one, has long been a matter of dispute.
Aside from an induction into different legal traditions, perhaps a difference in
training can be found in the projects that Minkkinen and Goodrich establish for
students. Both Minkkinen and Goodrich find the life of the jurist lacking and, in
many respects, poorly conducted. They both argue that one reason for this is that
critical jurists and jurisprudents cannot sort out their relationship to law. For
Minkkinen, drawing on Max Weber, one solution depends on how the jurist lives
with the twin restrictions of limited opportunities of delivering solutions to social
and political problems and limited ways of occupying their office.26 These limits are
to be met with Nietzschean affirmation. For Goodrich the issue is more one of
training oneself and other jurisprudents to occupy, or reoccupy, an expanded office
of the scholar. This task, as it happens, should also be met with the same

22.
23.

Id.
See PIERRE HADOT, THE PRESENT ALONE IS OUR HAPPINESS: CONVERSATIONS WITH
JEANNIE CARLIER AND ARNOLD I. DAVIDSON 109 (Marc Djaballah & Michael Chase trans., 2011).
24. See Tomlins, supra note 1, at 241.
25. See PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL EMBLEMS AND THE ART OF LAW: OBITER DEPICTA AS
THE VISION OF GOVERNANCE (2014).
26. Panu Minkkinen, The Legal Academic of Max Weber’s Tragic Modernity, 19 SOC. & LEG. STUD.
165 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1423442 (drawing Heidegger and Weber into
alignment in asking the question: how do we act responsibly in according with the form of life (office)
that we are in?).
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Nietzschean commitment as Minkkinen’s office holder. (Nietzsche himself
occupied the office of university scholar with ambivalence.)27
For many of the contributors to the “Law As . . .” symposia, the resources for
the cultivation of the persona of the scholar and of the means of occupying the
office of jurisprudent and/or humanist scholar are best met by drawing on
traditions of Greek metaphysics inherited through nineteenth and twentieth century
French and German philosophy. Minor jurisprudences, it has been suggested here,
can also be understood as taking up an inheritance of a training in a form of life.28
Recognition of this inheritance and its ways of life does not put an end to questions
of the responsibility of office or the conduct of a lawful life.29
III. “JURISPRUDENCE AS . . .” EXERCISE
It is clearly the case that along with the training in conduct offered by Kantian
and Neo-Kantian thought, versions of Heideggerian training in conduct have been
significant and influential in the faculties of humanities and law in America, Europe,
and elsewhere.30 However, these are not the only genres of training in conduct of
office that are available or addressed in the “Law As . . .” symposia. I would like to
address, briefly, some of these accounts.
Pierre Hadot has remarked that while Ludwig Wittgenstein was not a historian,
it was his account of language games and the links he made between logic and
mystical experience (the experience of wonder before the existence of the world)
that allowed him to engage historically with the fragmented character of ancient
philosophy as understood as a training in a way of life.31 Constantine Fasolt takes
up Wittgenstein’s approach to a way or form of life in his essay History, Law, and
Justice: Empirical Method and Conceptual Confusion in the History of Law.32 The substantive
point of departure of his essay is “the history of law [and thus the legal historian]
furnishes a kind of knowledge that is essential for maintaining justice.”33 His
concern is that without the writing of good legal history, law would be left to the
dead or to tyrants. One reading of Fasolt’s essay is that it provides a philosophical
grounding of the writing of legal history by explaining how law, language,
27. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, UNTIMELY MEDITATIONS (Daniel Breazeale ed., R.J. Hollingdale
trans., 1997).
28. See also Ian Hunter, The Mythos, Ethos, and Pathos of the Humanities, 40 HIST. EUROPEAN IDEAS
11, 18–23 (2013).
29. Marianne Constable also makes this point in working through her account of law as
language. See MARIANNE CONSTABLE, OUR WORD IS OUR BOND: HOW LEGAL SPEECH ACTS (2014);
Marianne Constable, Speaking Imperfectly: Law, Language, and History, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 349, 361
(2015).
30. See generally Hunter, supra note 28.
31. HADOT, supra note 23, at 132–35; Pierre Force, Teeth of Time: Pierre Hadot on Meaning and
Misunderstanding in the History of Ideas, 50 HIST. & THEORY 20 (2011), available at http://hdl.handle.net/
10022/AC:P:11190.
32. Constantin Fasolt, History, Law, and Justice: Empirical Method and Conceptual Confusion in the
History of Law, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 413, 418–438 (2015).
33. Id. at 418.
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judgement, and justice are intertwined. Another, not so different reading, is that
Fasolt, like Hadot, treats Wittgenstein as providing a philosophical training in a way
of life. Fasolt turns Wittgenstein’s teaching or training to the development of the
persona of the historian.
Fasolt’s argument is shaped by how to understand meaning: judgement,
agreement, and the relation between language and reality.34 This is considered
through Wittgenstein’s formula: “It is not only agreement in definitions, but also
(odd as it may sound) agreement in judgements that is required for communication
by means of language. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so.”35
While this formulation can be treated as part of Wittgenstein’s inquiry into
meaning, it can also be treated as a “spiritual exercise” designed to maintain a proper
relation to language and, it might be imagined, to those with whom communication
is sought. It is agreement in language that gives us a form of life. Whether such
agreements in language are formulated as techniques of transcendence or not is a
matter of historical investigation.
Wittgenstein’s philosophical writings, Michael McGhee has argued, should be
thought of as a series of exercises aimed at allowing for the cultivation of a certain
“coolness” or self-possession (sōphrosunē ) which might also be a way of describing
Fasolt’s ambition for the persona of the legal historian.36 The ability to draw
distinctions between knowing what people were saying and what they were doing
in the past requires judgement and forms of political community. The office of
historian, asserts Fasolt, requires us to say something about the past and claim that
it is true.37 The specific obligation of the legal historian is to judge the dead in
relation to a law, which itself passes judgement on that which is just and unjust.
Legal historians also have to take responsibility for such judgements. A failure to do
this adequately is a failure of office and an injustice. The training the Fasolt has
briefly drawn from Wittgenstein, then, is in part one engaged in the formation of a
self; it is necessary to cultivate a philosophical coolness. It is, in part, a cultivation
of the persona of the legal historian as someone who is able to judge (with courage)
and, in part, an ordering of the office of legal historian as concerned with relations
of law, justice, and political community.38

34.
35.

Id. at 425.
Id. at 423 (citing LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN
[PHILOSOPHICAL I NVESTIGATIONS], at xiv (P.M.S. Hacker & Joachim Schulte eds., G.E.M.
Anscombe et al. trans., Wiley-Blackwell 4th ed. 2009) (1953)).
36. Michael McGhee, Wittgenstein’s Temple: Or How Cool is Philosophy?, in PHILOSOPHY AS A WAY
OF LIFE: ANCIENTS AND MODERNS–ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PIERRE HADOT 241 (Michael Chase et al.
eds., 2013).
37. Fasolt, supra note 32, at 457.
38. The sense in which such formulations belong to metaphysical tradition is hard to assess. See
JOHN W. COOK, WITTGENSTEIN’S METAPHYSICS (1994). Fasolt draws his account in that direction by
tying his consideration of office to Aristotle’s account of polity.
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IV. PREPARATION
The accounts offered above all draw on traditions of European metaphysics
in order to formulate their accounts of the cultivation of the persona of philosopher,
historian, and jurisprudent. Such philosophical, historical, and jurisprudential
projects themselves can be written about in terms of intellectual, political,
jurisprudential, and social histories. While metaphysics as first philosophy often
carries within it a claim to form beyond history, Pierre Hadot has convincingly
shown that a history can be written of how to accede to, or succeed in living, a
philosophical or lawful life.
In “‘Law As . . .’ II, History As Interface for the interdisciplinary Study of
Law,” Jeffrey Minson’s account of the dignity of the civil state explicitly links the
cultivation of a persona for public life to office-based accounts of civil state and the
cultivation of a number of desacralised personae.39 In doing so, he draws attention
to the sorts of training in conduct offered through the rhetorical traditions of
training in public life. These skills are put to work in occupying the offices of the
modern state, including that of the University.40 As matter of political and moral
thought, some of these realities relate to the conditions of civil peace and
commonwealth and others to the sorts of moral anthropology that might be
appropriate to a civil prudence. Minson organises his moral anthropology around
human fallibility and imperfection. In such accounts, sociality might be viewed as
the realisation of human imperfection rather than the quest for perfection.41 The
concern of the state is not to perfect human life but to govern the conduct of
citizens in matters of civil order. Minson’s account of living with the state
emphasises both the plurality of offices that are occupied by a person at any one
time (artist, citizen, employee, friend, householder, jurist, jurisprudent, orator,
philosopher, and so forth) and the different forms of ethical and rhetorical
conduct—the two are linked—appropriate to each. In this account, the cultivation
of personae is a plural activity that accepts, as did Weber, that people require plural
personae, both within and without office, as they go about their business of
engaging in the world.42 The object of a civil prudence might be to enliven the
persona available to those who occupy office rather than a training in formation of
a unified persona fit for transcendence.
The training in conduct presented in Bonnie Honig’s article The Laws of the
Sabbath (Poetry): Arendt, Heine and the Politics of Debt is somewhat different.43 Like
Minson, Honig is concerned with the conduct of life, and both take the view that
ethical and rhetorical performance are closely linked. Whereas Minson’s repertoires
39. Jeffrey Minson, How to Speak Well of the State: A Rhetoric of Civil Prudence, 4 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 437, 440 (2014).
40. MINSON, supra note 18, at 3–15.
41. Minson, supra note 39, at 452.
42. Id.
43. Bonnie Honig, The Laws of the Sabbath (Poetry): Arendt, Heine, and the Politics of Debt, 5 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 463 (2015).
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of conduct are addressed to thinking creatively within office, Honig seeks to
establish the repertoires of resilience and preparation for political life, which include
modes of “rebellion, poetry, Sabbath-power, rights-claiming, and mockery of [those
very same] powers.”44 In so doing, she writes of the exemplary figure of the
“pariah.” The transformations Honig has to hand are extreme: that from the “dog
with dog’s ideas” to a “man with man’s emotions.”45 The power of transformation
is affected by the Sabbath and, by analogy, forms of strike such as the loan strike.46
Rather than follow the detail of Honig’s argument, I want to touch on the
training in conduct that is presented. Much of this essay is written in relation to
Hannah Arendt’s essay The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition. Honig suggests that
Arendt misses something of what is interesting in Heine’s poetry by focusing so
forcefully on “a standard of action or pariah consciousness.”47 Honig instead looks
at the preparation: the Sabbath in not a place of passive inactivity; it is the ceremony
and ritual of the Sabbath that enables the dogs to become humans. The Sabbath is
a state of exception where all divisions disappear through the intensification of
everyday life rather than its interruption. This intensification of the everyday is in
part a teaching of resilience.48
To explain the intensification of everyday, Honig turns to the work of the
psychoanalyst, Donald Winnicott and his understanding of how babies relate to and
use objects (especially mothers). In Winnicott’s account, it is through object use that
it is possible to learn mastery and come to understand permanence of objects.49 The
use is that of destruction and the lesson that of love (the object survives to be loved
(or not)) and/or autonomy (the object is destroyed and the baby learns autonomy
(or not)). The lesson Honig draws from this ties preparation and play to the fantasy
and permanence of objects. Transitional objects, Sabbath events or public things,
establish places from which resilience can be learnt. (Although Honig writes here
about the resilience of the self and persona of the conscious pariah (in the hidden
tradition), this might also be one way of thinking about the training in the conduct
of lawful relations within the common law tradition.)
V. JURISPRUDENCE AND HISTORY WRITING
As Chris Tomlins has noted, a significant part of the work of the “‘Law As . . .’
III” symposium has been conducted in the shadow of the relation between
jurisprudence and history writing. This topic could also be viewed as the central
topic of several traditions of philosophy, law, and history. All accounts of
44. Id. at 481.
45. Id. at 469.
46. For another jurisprudence that considers metamorphosis and shape shifting as a matter of
the actualisation of Law, see C.F. BLACK, THE LAND IS THE SOURCE OF THE LAW: A DIALOGIC
ENCOUNTER WITH INDIGENOUS JURISPRUDENCE (2011).
47. Honig, supra note 43, at 481.
48. Id.; see also Bonnie Honig, The Politics of Public Things: Neoliberalism and the Routine of Privatization,
10 NO FOUND. 59 (2013).
49. D.W. WINNICOTT, PLAYING AND REALITY 86–94 (1971).
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historiography and jurisprudence, no doubt, have their ways of personifying and
training the jurisprudent and historian, although whether or not such persona are
met in the figure of the legal historian is an open question. The final engagement
here with conduct of office will be restricted to two brief comments: the first relates
to the difficulties of thinking across genres of jurisprudence and history, and the
second addresses some of the welcome limits of jurisprudence and history. One
feature that is striking about the contributions to the “Law As . . .” symposia is their
easy eclecticism and the sense that the formation of a persona and the
transformation of law are to be related. These concerns might be gathered under
the heading of judgement of office: the consideration of the virtues and vices of
office, the means and ends of conduct, and the character of the scholar and the
minor jurisprudent (and legal historian).
In many ways, Kunal Parker’s essay Law ‘In’ and ‘As’ History: The Common Law
in the American Polity, 1790–1900 provides a counterpoint to redemptive or
transcendental histories of law by addressing the exhaustion of contextualist
historiography.50 For Parker, disputes about “contextualist” history and internal and
external accounts of history themselves have a history, which is usually told from a
modernist position of the ascendancy of contextualist, antifoundationalist history
writing. In this essay, he examines the historiography of the common law tradition
prior to the period when contextual or external history became predominant (O.W.
Holmes is treated as the exemplary jurist-philosopher-historian). In Parker’s
analysis, the histories of common law thought written by people within the common
law tradition are far from contextual; they have purpose and direction and do
dissipate into context. This, for Parker, is not so much the problem of knowledge
and method but of treating the practice of history writing as a form of conduct.
In Parker’s account, the common law thinkers of the early nineteenth century
were happy to work both within a common law account of legal form as existing
from “time immemorial,” and as well contributing to foundational and teleological
histories of law. It is not the case that the modern contextualist historians do not
notice or write of such forms of temporality (Parker has). It is more that the
historiography of critically inclined contextual legal historians (and the training
provided to meet and sustain such accounts) generally addresses different problems
to those that confronted legal historians of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.51 The anti-metaphysical and anti-sectarian aspects of modern contextual
history writing require historical contextualisation (rather than, say, philosophical
recuperation). More importantly for Parker, it is, in part, the writing of histories of
the common law that hold on to an “internal” account of law that also provides a

50. Kunal M. Parker, Law “In” and “As” History: The Common Law in the American Polity, 1790–
1900, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 587 (2011); see also Kunal M. Parker, Repetition in History: Anglo-American
Legal Debates and the Writings of Walter Bagehot, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 121 (2014).
51. David S. Caudill, Law, Science, and the Economy: One Domain?, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 393, 402
(2015); see also BRUNO LATOUR, AN INQUIRY INTO MODES OF EXISTENCE: AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF
THE MODERNS (Catherine Porter trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2013) (2012).
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point of engagement with the politics of law as a question of the conduct of
research.52
The second set of examples points briefly to the ways certain historical
practices are treated as making visible the virtues of the office of the legal historian.
At issue is not methodology as such, but the maintenance of a relation between the
technology or craft of history writing and conduct of office. A list of these might
include aide memoires on the repertoires of history writing: make visible the
conduct and conflicts of law; examine and write histories of law with the recognition
that there is more than one law;53 establish relations of authority and inheritance of
legal forms;54 attend to the times of law;55 address the subjectivity of scale;56
maintain a relationship between history writing and historiography, jurisprudence
writing and jurisography;57 engage the state rhetorically not theologically;58 or, more
simply, maintain the tools of your science. Treated as methodological statements,
there is not much to say (except perhaps to apologise to a number of scholars for
presenting a travesty of their scholarship). However, as Pierre Hadot has noted, the
fragmentary form of such points of advice, reflection, and exercises provides the
focal points for the consideration of the conduct of office.59
CONCLUSION
In writing about the contributors to “Law As . . .” as participating, if only
briefly, in the office of minor jurisprudent, I have given emphasis to reporting forms
of training in conduct, rather than provide a critical reflection or forms of
disciplinary critique. In part, this reflects the genre of the afterword: reporting
52. See also Shai J. Lavi, Humane Killing and the Ethics of the Secular: Regulating the Death Penalty,
Euthanasia, and Animal Slaughter, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 297 (2014). Like Parker, Lavi questions our
contemporary understanding of our legal system (those who live within a common law tradition) and
reconsiders the ways in which “secularization” is understood. Id. at 315–16. Lavi argues that suffering
pain has become meaningless in the secular ordering of life. Id. at 319. At the same time, however, the
painless death has become a source of meaning and emblem of modern bloodless sacred killing or
better a bloodless emblem of what was once sacred killing. Id. at 323. For Lavi, one task of the historian
is to maintain the visibility of this relation.
53. Susan Bibler Coutin et al., Routine Exceptionality: The Plenary Power Doctrine, Immigrants, and the
Indigenous Under U.S. Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 97 (2014).
54. Michelle A. McKinley, Standing on Shaky Ground: Criminal Jurisdiction and Ecclesiastical Immunity
in Seventeenth-Century Lima, 1600–1700, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 141 (2014) (joining histories of slavery in
Peru to practices of record keeping and care of archive); see also Prabha Kotiswaran, Beyond Sexual
Humanitarianism: A Postcolonial Approach to Anti-Trafficking Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 353 (2014)
(treating labor and migration regulation as framing forms of lives of sex workers).
55. Renisa Mawani, Law As Temporality: Colonial Politics and Indian Settlers, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
65 (2014) (re-configuring rival temporalities of law: time as a technique of government, history writing).
56. Kotiswaran, supra note 54, at 379–80; Mariana Valverde, The Rescaling of Feminist Analyses of
Law and State Power: From (Domestic) Subjectivity to (Transnational) Governance Networks, 4 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 325 (2014).
57. Bernadette Meyler, Law, Literature, and History: The Love Triangle, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 365
(2015).
58. Brook Thomas, Reconstructing the Limits of Schmitt’s Theory of Sovereignty: A Case for Law As
Rhetoric, Not As Political Theology, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 239 (2014).
59. HADOT, supra note 23, at 191–95.
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provides a way of engaging materials as part of a practical activity of training in
conduct without forcing too much unity on the sorts of projects that have appeared
in the “Law As . . .” symposia. In part, it offers a way of limiting the question of
training in the conduct of living with law to a limited range of concerns with the
“government of the tongue.” The office of minor jurisprudent that emerges is still,
no doubt, housed within the university; the various styles of training in conduct of
office do, in significant ways, require the formation of a self and the cultivation of
a persona that address concerns apart from office.
The Afterword presented here has taken its cue from the provocation of
conducts of life in terms of glossolalia. The engagement with glossolalia within
church traditions has rarely been uncontested. For the Christian protestant
Pentecostal churches, speaking in tongues takes on the signs of the presence and
gift of the Holy Spirit. For Saint Paul, the concerns with glossolalia and Holy Spirit
merge with concerns about the translation of the true spirit in tongues and of false
possession.60 In the “Law As . . .” symposia, the concern with the spirit of the law
has been more with the enchantment, disenchantment, and re-enchantment of
jurisprudence through the practices of history writing and the recasting of the
concerns of lawful life.
If the office of the minor jurisprudent has duties in relation to the
“government of the tongue,” however, it is not so much the direct expression of
the spirit of law or justice, but one divided or split between the intervention in the
present by asking questions of the past and the setting of the scene for “new laws.”
The offices of jurisprudent clearly establish a broad range of duties and few of the
personae taken up by anthropologists, jurisprudents, historians, rhetoricians,
philosophers, and political economists who care for the conduct of lawful relations
would find commonality only in a single persona or way of life. For this reason, I
have proceeded by emphasising both the plurality of personae of office and the
forms of exercise and training undertaken in their formation. However, to leave a
symposium or three symposia only in this way is also a neglect of office, since a
symposium enacts, as it should, another obligation of the scholar: the conduct of
intellectual friendship.

60. KIRSOPP LAKE, THE EARLIER EPISTLES OF ST. PAUL: THEIR MOTIVE AND ORIGIN 204,
244 (1911).
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